Introduction
The Yellow River basin is the site of myriad water resource problems. The Yellow River has natural geomorphological characteristics that include seasonally variable flow, very high sediment load, and the capacity to flood with devastating effect.
However, people have long sought to harness the water of the Yellow River to their own industrial and agricultural ends, so as to attain the things that they value, like good health, economic growth, and employment. Intensive human use of the basin now poses new managerial problems.
The Yellow River's problems thus now include water scarcity, pollution, and flood risk.
In 1997 there were 226 'no flow' days, when the River failed to reach the sea; the dry point started up to 700km inland ). This is not part of the natural flow regime of the Yellow River, which rarely ceased to flow before 1992. The Yellow River is also one of China's most polluted rivers.
1 While a major breach of the levees has been averted since the People's Republic was founded in 1949, there is each year significant flooding in the Yellow River basin. The threat of a major levee failure is real and millions of lives and vast sums of capital investment will be lost in such an event, or if one of the many dams along its length fails. management at the national level may also be needed. In other words, in both the conceptual and the spatial sense, some borders must be respected but others inhibit understanding.
The paper has two principal sections. In the first, we trace the emergence of the problems of the Yellow River by linking the changing condition of the River to the economic transition that has been underway in China since 1978. After this groundwork, we turn in the second section to identify some of the key issues involved in managing the Yellow River. This discussion illustrates the interaction of local (within border) and larger scale (hierarchical and cross scale) issues and reveals the manner in which the constraints of the existing discourse conceal non-technical solutions. We conclude by reflecting on the manner in which the management of the River reveals national priorities and goals.
The Yellow River
Since the late 1970s the Chinese government has approved and sometimes initiated a set of incremental policy experiments. Largely concerned to raise the efficiency with which people produce and trade, this transition has nevertheless had profound effects on social life and environmental conditions. Its effects on water resources were largely unintentional and unanticipated. Evidence of these problems has emerged since the early 1990s, yet understanding of their extent, causes, and solutions is far from complete.
China's Economic Transition
The economic reforms in China since 1978 have entailed a shift away from central economic planning towards more market-oriented forms of economy that include state, collective, and private forms of business. This transition has been endogenously driven, and has occurred through gradual, regular and incremental adjustments in institutions.
China's transition has involved moves to 'open up' the economy to international markets. The changes have seen increased foreign direct investment 3 and the marketisation of production and distribution systems. In almost all sectors of production, including agriculture, state-directed production has now been replaced by market-directed production. The Household Responsibility System (HRS) led to increased agricultural productivity, increased total output, and increased production of vegetables, meat and other higher value farm products. The market now is the largest determinant of household farm production, and more than half of agricultural income is earned from cash sales of farm products. 4 Rural industrialisation was also a consequence of the HRS.
China is now a set of competing economic systems: centralised political control coexists with market-oriented firms; state-owned enterprises coexist with capitalist foreignfunded firms. State-owned and private enterprises compete to attract resources (including labour and land), and to sell their products or services; individuals now compete for jobs and choose among different forms of activity; and central and regional governments can choose among different systems depending on their capacity to dispense revenues or power, to ameliorate social conflict, or to deliver on the promise of economic growth. 5 The effect has been a new division of activities between the various ways of organising social, political and economic life within China, 6 including countless changes in water use.
The Household Responsibility System
The HRS created the opportunity for farmers to expand their incomes by intensifying agricultural production. 18 Beijing's growing demand for water has translated directly into reduced allocations of water to agriculture and rapid decreases in aquifers around the city.
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Relative to other regions in China, water is scarce in the Yellow River basin. 20 Urban uses of water in the basin increased by 245% between 1980 and 1993, 21 and use is highest in Shanxi, Shaanxi, Henan, and Shandong. 22 Urban demands are likely to be increasingly influential as urban centres are the basis of political power in China, as in almost every country. This is despite the fact that the welfare of urban residents is rarely as sensitive to changes in water supply as is the welfare of resource-dependent rural people.
As incomes continue to rise there has been a decline in the proportion of cereals being consumed, and an increase in consumption and production of more expensive, higher quality food products, especially animal products. 23 Between 1979 and 2002, the supply of calories from animal products more than quadrupled, as did meat production; the supply of calories from fruits increased five fold and production of fruits increased more than eight-fold; calorie supply from vegetables quadrupled and production of vegetables increased more than seven-fold. 24 Increasing production of meat has entailed increased production of feed grains, so that between 1991 and 1996, the production of coarse feed grain increased more than any other cereal. 25 These changes in demand and supply are important for water use since fruits, vegetables, nuts, dairy products and meat are less water efficient (they use more water per calorie delivered) than wheat or corn. That is, fruit, vegetables and animal products are economically more efficient than grains, in the sense that they yield more dollars' worth of output per cubic metre of water applied; but they are less water efficient than grains. Thus, the development of a market economy is leading farmers to become more economically efficient, but less water efficient. Corn is more efficient than wheat, with corn's water efficiency at 1.96 kg /m -3
. 26 While the conversion of farmland to horticulture (and fish ponds) has been greatest in the populous southern areas, increased production of non-grain foods has also occurred in the Yellow River basin. For example, in Henan and Shandong food production now includes an increasing proportion of non-grain crops as farmers seek higher economic returns per unit of water used. There has also been an increase in corn production for feed grain. again since. 31 These industrial uses have contributed to increased demand (and therefore increased scarcity) for water, and to water pollution. In particular, the more than 500000 township and village enterprises seem to be exempt in both policy and practice from 25 Tian & Chudleigh (1999) .
26 Yang & Zehnder (2001: 92) . 28 Heilig (1999) . 29 Ibid.
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31 . In the regions where industrialisation has been most rapid there have been the largest declines in allocation of labour, land and finance for agricultural purposes. This shift of capital away from agriculture occurred rapidly in the southern and coastal regions.
However, these are also the regions that have the most abundant water resources and are climatically the most suitable for agriculture. This has in turn caused a relocation of agricultural production in China.
The Changing Geography of Agriculture
The areas where industrialisation has been relatively less rapid have taken up the resulting gap in agricultural supply, particularly of less profitable crops such as wheat.
However, these areas are generally dry, and three of the five provinces with largest net gains in the area of cultivated land between 1988 and 1995 were in the Yellow River basin (Gansu, Ningxia and Qinghai). These areas cannot meet the gap in supply created by reduced production in the South without using irrigation and fertilisers, leading to overdrawing of groundwater and excessive water pollution. As a proportion of all water use, irrigation use is high in the Yellow River basin. 33 Heilig (1999 45 Levels of human development in these provinces are less than the Chinese average, and are equivalent to those of Tajikistan, Mongolia and Egypt. 46 The principal cause of these relatively low levels of human development is low production (by value) in most provinces: with the exception of Shandong all the Yellow River provinces rank lower in GDP per capita than they do in the overall HDI. Household incomes, particularly in rural areas, are low. This means that access to water is critical to the livelihoods of most of the ~130 million rural people who depend on water from the Yellow River basin.
So, while industrial water use and pollution in the Yellow River basin are both growing, and while urban demands are rising, it is farmers who are the group most sensitive to water problems. The implications of changes in farmer's entitlements to useable water (a function of quantity, cost, and quality) may be profound, not just for individual rural households, but also for North China, and perhaps even China as a whole. Indeed, it may be prudent for policymakers to consider these farmers as the most important stakeholders in water reforms in the basin. Solutions require an understanding of the vulnerability of rural livelihoods to changes in entitlements to water.
Questions of borders, boundaries and access
It is the interaction of regional conditions, developments in other provinces, and supraregional policies that defines the nature of and the solutions to the problems of managing the water supply of the Yellow River. However, the discourses about water in the Yellow River basin restrict people's understanding of these problems and their potential solutions. We now identify some of the key issues involved in managing the Yellow River, illustrating the interaction of local and larger scale issues and of discourse and management. 
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Choice of policy instruments
Once established, the governance system decides on policy goals and targets, and then selects instruments for implementing policy. Too frequently the choice of policy instruments is framed as a debate between regulation and market based mechanisms, 57 and this is true of discussions about solutions to water problems in the Yellow River basin. Yet there are many more policy instruments than these. Dovers (1995) lists 13 instruments for implementing policy, including: education and training; consultation, mediation and negotiation; agreements and conventions; regulation by the State; selfregulation by users; community involvement in management; removal or adjustment of distorting policies; and market mechanisms. Even market mechanisms include a variety of instruments, including taxes, user charges, subsidies, penalties, tradeable permits, and performance or assurance bonds. 58 This variety of policy instruments suggests that there are many choices for achieving policy goals and that there is likely to be an effective instrument for each particular water use and user. Regardless of the instrument chosen, all policy instruments are best seen as information that requests, orders, encourages, warns, and creates incentives for desirable forms of action.
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Commonly, the selection of policy instruments depends on the biases of agencies and advocates, and on traditional ways of doings things. 60 Yet there are more rational criteria for selecting the best policy instrument, including: equity -since the distributional outcomes of one instrument choice can undermine larger policy goals; political feasibility -since some instruments may not be accepted by groups and/or users with power; institutional feasibility -since some institutions may not be capable of implementing some instruments (for various reasons ranging from legal mandate through to staff skills); the ability to monitor progress of the instrument's effectiveness (or not); the degree to which an instrument can be enforced; and the degree to which the 
Access: the price of agricultural water in the Yellow River basin
The official discourse within China and among its advisors suggests that unsustainable water use in the basin is largely due to the low cost of irrigation, and propose that commodity pricing would encourage more efficient water use in rural areas. 63 The principal effect of this policy will be to increase the cost of inputs into farming.
Farmers' responses to changes in the price of irrigation water depend on its price. 64 If water is cheap, a price rise does not cause farmers to change their cropping decisions or irrigation practices, so they simply pay more for the same amount of water. At higher prices, farmers respond to price increases by substituting new crops (that demand less water or produce higher incomes per unit of applied water) for their traditional crops.
Farmers still lose income, but water is saved. Then at very high prices, farmers use almost no water for irrigation anyway, so price increases have little effect on their cropping decisions or irrigation practices.
61 Dovers (1995 Those whose livelihoods most depend upon water (farmers) are typically poor and their incomes may not support a sudden shift to market-valuation. The net effect of increased production costs is to transfer income out of agriculture, so that small farmers become uncompetitive and production becomes dominated by fewer but larger farms, with a net loss of employment in agriculture, increased number of landless labourers and ruralurban migration. So, the social impacts of water pricing are significant, and the identification of winners and losers from such a policy -including the implications for China as a whole -is important. If pricing is to be the regulatory tool, it is important to determine a price of rural water that avoids adverse social consequences but achieves gains in efficiency.
Pricing is merely one way of rationing farmers' entitlement to water. Others include consultation, negotiation, convention, State regulation, user self-regulation and community management, 65 though they are outside the terms of current debates in
China. The implications of changes in farmer's entitlements to useable water may be profound, not just for individual rural households, but also for North China, and perhaps even China as a whole.
Regional borders: south-north water transfers
The South-North Water Transfer Scheme involves constructing a network of canals to divert water from the Yangtze (south) to the Yellow River Basin (north). It began in December 2002 and is expected to take fifty years to complete at a cost of US$58 billion. The economic costs of the project are twice those of the Three Gorges Dam, 66 and should these costs ever be fully incorporated into the price of water North China's farmers may be no longer competitive.
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Transforming Cultures eJournal Vol. If this conclusion is correct, then the place of the south-north transfer in China's development policy needs to be questioned. If at least some of the water is to be used for agriculture, then it will have to be subsidised; so commitment to the scheme signals that the state intends to subsidise farmers, keeping them in rural areas and producing food -for reasons of national food security or to prevent mass migration of pauperised farmers to the cities, perhaps. If most of the water is sold to urban-industrial consumers, then the scheme will increase their total entitlement without reducing that of farmers.
There may, too, be other benefits -for example, associated with lower flood risks on the Yangtze River and hydro-power development. In other words, the State's endorsement of this project implies a commitment to keep China the way it is: China can more or less feed itself; most peasants remain on the land; urbanisation and industrialisation can proceed at the current pace.
Conclusions
There do not seem to be any simple solutions to water problems in the Yellow River basin. If nothing else, our analysis suggests that at least some solutions to water 68 Yang et al (2003) . There is a lot of interest in increasing the cost of water, particularly to farmers, as a way of encouraging more efficient use of water in the Yellow River Basin. However, bearing in mind the relative poverty of most farmers in the basin, and that water costs are already high in many places, 70 higher water prices may merely raise poverty by increasing farmers' production costs. 71 If it is to be implemented, water pricing will require careful central government control in establishing, maintaining, and monitoring water markets and their potential social repercussions. In other words, management solutions require local understanding rather than the simple import of American, Australian and European practices. Clear property rights over small irrigation systems would encourage towns and villages to maintain and improve them. 72 Increasing farm profits could also be achieved through more direct measures such as a non-production based transfer to farmers in water scarce regions, low rates of taxation to increase profitability, subsidies on certain forms of production to encourage farming in the most ecologically suitable places, and subsidies on water conservation technologies.
National-level water planning may also help to locate some of the most water intense forms of agricultural and industrial production in the places where water is most 70 Yang et al (2003) . 71 Lohmar et al (2003) ; Yang et al (2003) .
72 Lohmar et al (2003) . abundant (the South and East). During the transition, power was decentralised to provincial and lower level governments, whose increasingly autonomous development plans in effect set these jurisdictions in competition with each other for the available water resources. An effective water governance system requires national coordination to clarify the jurisdictions, roles, and authorities of various central government agencies, river valley commissions, provincial governments, municipalities, counties, irrigation districts, and water management committees. 73 The problems of the Yellow River are national and resolution of them requires national initiatives.
These conclusions can be re-expressed within the terms of the debate in this volume over borders. At one level, borders are spatial; and we have argued that understanding and effective management are constrained by thinking solely in terms of the Yellow River basin. These spatial borders need to be re-imagined as both permeable and hierarchical, and liable to rescaling as development alters the relations between places.
At another level, though, are the constraints that limit the discourses about the problems and the management of the Yellow River. These are borders that need to be broken down, so that the relations between proposed solutions and broader social considerations are more properly understood.
